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abstract: In this paper, I assess the analysis of vagueness of objects in terms of the 
theory of constitution with respect to the notion of vague identity . Some proponents 
of the constitution theory see it as an advantage of their account that analysing the 
spatial and temporal vagueness of objects in terms of the relation of vague constitu-
tion avoids commitment to vague identity, which is seen as a controversial notion . I 
argue that even though the constitution theory may plausibly be applied to the phe-
nomenon of vague boundaries, it fails to account fully for other cases of spatial and 
temporal vagueness . There are what I call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness cases, in which 
the tools of the constitution theory applied in the analysis of boundary vagueness are 
insufficient to avoid commitment to vague identity .
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According to the constitution theory, there is a unique relation of constitu-
tion which relates persisting composite objects to the pieces of material that 
they are made from . The relation is typically invoked to account for the pos-
sibility of objects’ changing by losing and gaining parts and to explain some 
puzzles of material constitution . But several philosophers have also utilized 
the relation to account for certain kinds of vagueness . In particular, it has 
been used to provide a metaphysical, as opposed to linguistic, account of 
vague objects, that is, objects with vague boundaries and vague parts . Vague 
objects, metaphysically conceived, are controversial postulates, because, it has 
been argued, their existence would entail the possibility of vague identity, an 
allegedly incoherent concept . Some proponents of the constitution theory 
claim, however, that locating the vagueness of objects in the constitution re-
lation can make sense of the idea of vague boundaries and parts without the 
troubling entailment of vague identity . In this paper I argue that the claims 
of the proponents of the constitution theory are only plausible with respect to 
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vague boundaries . But objects are also affected by what I call ‘mid-extension’ 
vagueness and it seems that the constitution relation cannot account for this 
phenomenon . The proponents either have to deny vagueness in these cases, 
account for it in an unsystematic way, or accept vague identity and defend 
its coherence .
The relation of constitution
Constitution is a relation that, according to its proponents, holds between 
an object and the piece of material from which it is made .1 Typically, the 
constituted object is taken to be a macro-object persisting over time, such as a 
bronze statue, clay pot, plastic cup or animal (with the latter category includ-
ing human beings) . The constituted objects need not, however, be limited to 
macro-objects . As long as the object is composite and persists, as a result of 
which it can gain and lose its parts, it will be constituted by some material .2 
The constituting object is usually considered to be the piece of material from 
which the macro-object is made – a piece of bronze, a lump of clay, a piece of 
plastic or organic tissue . To avoid referring to specific kinds of material and 
instead refer to the ultimate constituents, philosophers often speak generally 
of aggregates of matter . The constitution relation is an irreflexive, asymmetrical 
relation, whereby the constituting object shares matter with the constituted 
object without being identical to it .
A number of philosophers have appealed to or defended the relation of 
constitution .3 One of the most recent and elaborate accounts of constitution 
is provided by Baker:
let “F*x” stand for “x has F as its primary kind property” and likewise for other 
predicate variables .
(C*) x constitutes y at t = df . There are distinct primary-kind properties F and 
G and G-favorable circumstances such that:
(1) F*x & G*y &,
(2) x and y are spatially coincident at t, and ∀z(z is spatially coincident with x 
at t and G*z → z = y); 
(3) x is in G-favorable circumstances at t; &
(4) It is necessary that: ∀z[(F*zt & z is in G-favorable circumstances at t) → 
∃w(G*wt & z is spatially coincident with w at t)] .
1 Although constitution has also been claimed to hold between other entities, such as 
events or properties, I will only focus on the relation with respect to objects . See Wasserman 
(2018) .
2 Fine (2003) suggests that it would make sense to distinguish between the constituted 
object and the constituting matter even in cases of necessary coincidence, that is, in situations 
where an object is necessarily composed of the same matter . 
3 See, for instance, Baker (2000), Johnston (1992), lowe (1983, 1995a, 1995b) or Shoe-
maker (1999, 2003) . 
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(5) It is possible that: ∃t{(x exists at t & ∼∃w[G*wt & w is spatially coincident 
with x at t])}; &
(6) If x is of one basic kind of stuff, then y is of the same basic kind of stuff . 
(Baker 2007: 161)
A number of points require explanation . I will use the example of the statue 
of David and the piece of marble from which it is made to illustrate the in-
dividual points .
A primary kind is the most fundamental kind that a thing is . For in-
stance, David is most fundamentally a statue and not a piece of marble, and 
the piece of marble is most fundamentally a piece of marble, not a statue . A 
thing’s primary kind determines its persistence conditions . For example, if 
something is most fundamentally a statue, it can survive the replacement of 
one of its parts, but if something is most fundamentally a piece of marble, 
then it cannot lose a part, as is standardly believed .
G-favourable circumstances are circumstances that enable an object of 
a certain primary kind to constitute an object of the primary kind G . For 
instance, if G is a statue, then the G-favourable circumstances will include 
conditions such as the existence of art, displaying the object in the artistic 
community, etc . If these circumstances did not obtain, the piece of marble 
could not constitute David .
Suppose that ‘F’ stands for the primary kind ‘piece of marble’ and ‘G’ for 
the primary kind ‘statue’ . Then:
(1) states that x is most fundamentally a piece of marble and y is most 
fundamentally a statue .
(2) states that a constituter cannot constitute two distinct things of the 
same kind at once; x and y spatially coincide and if there is another 
object that spatially coincides with x and is of primary kind G, then 
it is identical to y . So the piece of marble that constitutes David 
could not at the same time constitute another statue .
(3) states that the conditions required for a piece of marble to constitute 
a statue are in place .
(4) states that it is necessary that for any piece of marble placed in statue-
favourable circumstances there will be a statue spatially coincident 
with that piece of marble .
(5) states that it is possible that the piece of marble does not always 
spatially coincide with a statue . There are times when the piece of 
marble does not constitute a statue .
(6) ensures that the constituting and the constituted things are of the 
same stuff . In particular, if one is material, the other is material, 
too .
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The distinction between objects and aggregates of matter has been in-
voked to account for a number of puzzles that arise regarding the material 
constitution of objects . For instance, in the case of a statue carved from mar-
ble it seems that there is just one object . We would not weigh the statue and 
the piece of marble separately and then add the two measurements together 
to determine whether the pedestal can support ‘their’ weight . On the other 
hand, the statue and the marble may differ in a number of properties – the 
statue is a work of art, the marble is not; the statue may be of high quality 
even though the marble is not, or vice versa; the marble may come from a 
particular quarry while the statue does not . The friend of constitution will 
claim that the statue and the piece of marble are two distinct things (as evi-
denced by the distinct properties) which materially and spatially coincide .
Another puzzle arises when we want to explain how objects can change 
and yet survive the change . A statue is made from a particular piece of mar-
ble . If it loses a part, it will be made from a different piece of marble . So if 
objects are nothing but the pieces of material they are made from, a statue 
cannot lose a part without ceasing to exist and being replaced by a new statue . 
That is counterintuitive . The friends of constitution can claim that statues 
are not pieces of marble and that losing or gaining parts is possible in virtue 
of the statue being constituted by one piece of marble prior to the loss and 
another piece of marble after the loss .
Philosophers have struggled with these and some other puzzles of mate-
rial constitution for a long time . however, the constitution theory has also 
been offered as a remedy to some more recent issues that arise in relation to 
the phenomenon of vague objects .
The vagueness of objects
A number of philosophers have pointed out that the distinction between 
objects and aggregates of matter can provide a plausible account of vague 
objects . In what follows, I will describe the problem and show how the dis-
tinction is supposed to help .
It is a well-known fact that there are sentences in ordinary language that 
seem to have a somewhat indeterminate status between truth and falsity . For 
example, ‘A man with a height of 185 cm is tall’ or ‘France is hexagonal’ 
seem to be neither definitely true nor definitely false . Importantly, sentences 
describing the constitution and persistence of objects also belong to the class 
of indeterminate sentences . For instance, it may be argued that it is indeter-
minate whether Crimea was part of Ukraine in November 2018, whether 
conception is the beginning of human life or whether a neocortically dead 
person is dead .
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The traditional account considers this indeterminacy4 to be the result of 
the imprecision of our descriptions of the world . The semantic theory argues 
that the reason why these sentences have an indeterminate truth value is that 
the concepts used in them are not precisely defined .5 It is a typical and often 
welcome feature of ordinary language that it enables us to express ourselves 
in a somewhat vague manner, since absolute precision is sometimes unneces-
sary and hinders efficient communication . That is why we have not come 
up with precise definitions of the expressions ‘tall’, ‘the shape of France’, etc . 
But, the theory claims, we could, if we wished to, provide precise definitions, 
or precisify the concepts, and eliminate the vagueness in our language . We 
could, for instance, stipulate that a certain geographical area is ‘part of ’ a 
country only if it has been internationally recognized as one, or alternatively 
if it is de facto under the control of the country’s administration . In any case, 
the semantic theory of indeterminacy presupposes that the world is precise, 
and that all vagueness is of linguistic origin and consists in the availability of 
many candidates to be the referents of our expressions . One version of the 
linguistic account of vagueness, the epistemic theory, claims that we are in 
principle incapable of knowing where the seams in nature lie, but that these 
seams do exist and, as a result, all of the sentences of our language are defi-
nitely true or definitely false; we just cannot determine which is the case .6
Some other philosophers find the linguistic account of vagueness dissat-
isfactory and have proposed alternative accounts committed to the idea that 
the world itself is also vague and that some of the vagueness in our language 
is the result of worldly vagueness . One source of dissatisfaction with the tra-
ditional account is the idea that we could make our language more precise . 
Some philosophers have challenged that idea . For example, Baker suggests 
that if we want to precisify a vague term, we will ultimately have to use other 
terms that will turn out to be in need of precisification . ‘Vagueness may be 
pushed around, but not eliminated, by our decisions’ (Baker 2007: 125) . 
Noonan does not believe in the possibility of ultimate precisifications, either: 
‘The proponent of semantic indecision supposes that there are precisifica-
tions, i .e ., ways in which we could, in principle, sharpen up our general terms 
4 A terminological note: Some authors distinguish between vagueness and indetermi-
nacy . In this paper, I do not make a semantic distinction between these two notions . however, 
I find it more natural to speak of indeterminate, rather than vague, sentences and states of af-
fairs on the one hand, and vague, rather than indeterminate, spatial and temporal boundaries 
of objects on the other . 
5 The modern history of semanticism dates back at least to Russell (1923) . Some of the 
more recent defenders of the general idea behind semanticism include Fine (1975), Keefe 
(2000), lewis (1983) and Noonan (2013) .
6 The most notable account and defence of epistemicism is presented in Williamson 
(1994) .
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in order to secure a determinate reference . But it is plausible that this is mere 
fantasy’ (Noonan 2013: 243) . Van Inwagen, discussing various principles of 
composition,7 argues that if one wants to avoid extreme principles of compo-
sition such as universalism or nihilism, one must face up to the fact that there 
are no sharp boundaries in reality: ‘If we remember that actual material ob-
jects are composed of molecules and attend to the fact that interaction among 
molecules is, at bottom, a matter of the interaction of continuous electromag-
netic fields, we must concede that contact is as much a relation with vague 
boundaries as are friendship and mutual admiration . What goes for Contact 
goes for Fastening, Cohesion, and Fusion’ (van Inwagen 1995: 236) .
It seems, then, that vagueness is also a property of objects8 themselves 
and not just a property of the language that describes them . let us now turn 
to the various aspects of the vagueness of objects that have drawn philoso-
phers’ attention . First, there is the problem of vague spatial boundaries . This 
concerns the delineation of the boundaries of large structures ranging from 
countries to galaxies as well as regular-sized objects such as books or apples, 
whose boundaries are just as vague when judged from a microscopic perspec-
tive . Next, there is the problem of vague parts, which is closely related to the 
problem of vague boundaries, because the question of an object’s boundaries 
can be translated into the question of whether a problematic segment is part 
of the given object or not . Another closely related problem has been called the 
Problem of the Many (Unger 1980). Briefly explained: there is a large number 
of precise aggregates of matter in the vicinity of any vague object . Each of 
these aggregates is an equally suitable candidate to be the object . There are 
no rational criteria for preferring one of the aggregates over the others . As a 
result, we have to concede that where we thought there was a single object, 
such as a cloud or a mountain, there is, in fact, a great number of them . Then 
there is the problem of vague temporal boundaries, because we do not nor-
mally think that objects come into existence and cease to exist in an instant . 
Also, there is the problem of vague composition . This concerns the question 
of when some objects, the candidate parts, compose a larger object . This is 
related to the problem of the vagueness of existence, because some believe that 
if it is indeterminate whether the candidate parts compose a whole, then it 
must be indeterminate whether the whole exists . In what follows, I will be 
primarily concerned with questions of vague spatial and temporal bounda-
7 Principles of composition state under which circumstances two or more objects com-
pose another . For example, the principle van Inwagen calls Contact states that objects compose 
another object if and only if they are in contact .
8 Worldly vagueness or indeterminacy need not concern only objects . Some argue, for 
instance, that the indeterminacy of the future is also metaphysical . In fact, it is quite difficult 
to imagine in what sense the indeterminacy of the future could be a matter of semantic indeci-
sion . See for instance Wilson (2013: 360) .
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ries, though I will touch upon the issue of vague existence when discussing 
Baker’s theory .
let me now briefly turn to the question of why someone might prefer to 
avoid any talk of metaphysical, as opposed to linguistic, vagueness . Opponents 
of the idea of ‘worldly’ vagueness consider the idea either unintelligible or inco-
herent . For instance, lewis claims that the vagueness of an object’s boundaries 
can be either understood as the presence of a multiplicity of precise boundaries, 
or as the ignorance of the object’s precise boundaries, or in terms of the object’s 
fading away, with the presence of the object being a matter of degree, diminish-
ing as the distance from the region in which the object is most intensely present 
increases . lewis, however, states: ‘None of these three pictures is right . Each 
one in its own way replaces the alleged vagueness of the object by precision’ 
(lewis 1999: 170) . Morreau, who is not opposed to the idea of vague objects, 
also mentions that the opposition to the idea has roots in its lack of intelligi-
bility . he claims that allowing that objects may have questionable parts seems 
to entail that composition must be vague and, therefore, that it is sometimes 
indeterminate whether the would-be parts compose a further object and, as a 
result, whether this further object exists . Then he comments: ‘Now this idea is 
genuinely mysterious . how can something neither quite be nor not be there? 
Must we imagine that the presence of vague objects is somehow a matter of 
degree, like the intensity of a beam of light?’ (Morreau 2002: 336)
Many philosophers attack the concept of vague objects not for its unin-
telligibility, but for the fact that it allegedly entails the concept of vague iden-
tity, which has been shown to be incoherent . Why think that vague objects 
lead to vague identity?
Imagine an object that is such that it is indeterminate whether another 
object is part of it . Suppose, for instance, that at the foot of Mt . Everest there 
is a tower such that it is indeterminate whether the tower is part of Everest 
or whether it lies outside its boundary . Call the tower simply Tower . This is 
how such vagueness in parthood or spatial boundary is supposed to lead to 
vagueness of identity: The question of whether Everest includes Tower ena-
bles us to distinguish two aggregates of matter in the vicinity of Everest, one 
which consists of all the matter composing Everest plus the matter compos-
ing Tower, let us call this A1, and one which consists only of all the matter 
composing Everest, but does not include the matter composing Tower, let us 
call this A2 . The reasoning goes as follows: If Everest includes Tower, then 
Everest is (identical to) A1; if Everest does not include Tower, then Everest 
is (identical to) A2 . But it is indeterminate whether Everest includes Tower . 
Thus, it is indeterminate whether Everest is (identical to) A1 and it is indeter-
minate whether Everest is (identical to) A2 .9
9 Examples of this sort can be found in, e .g ., Morreau (2002: 338) and Noonan (2013: 246) .
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So it seems that the adherent of the possibility of objects with vague 
parts or boundaries is committed to the possibility of the vagueness of the 
identity relation . But the notion of vague identity is extremely controversial . 
Many follow Evans (1978) in claiming that the notion is incoherent, because 
supposing that objects might be vaguely identical leads via a few steps of 
logically sound reasoning to the conclusion that the supposed objects are 
definitely distinct . Evans claims that if we suppose that a and b are vaguely 
identical, then one of the objects will have a property the other one lacks . 
Namely, a will be such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to b . 
But since it is not indeterminate whether b is identical to b, b is not such 
that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to b . So, a and b differ in their 
properties . By the contrapositive of leibniz’s law, any objects differing in 
their properties must be determinately distinct . As a result, a and b are deter-
minately distinct, contrary to the initial hypothesis that they are vaguely, or 
indeterminately, identical .
Of course, Evans’ argument has been subject to criticism . Some critics 
point out that the argument relies on the contrapositive of leibniz’s law, 
which is invalid in indeterminacy contexts (see Parsons 2000: 37) . Another 
objection is that the argument illegitimately assumes that predicates such as 
being such that it is indeterminate whether it is identical to b express genuine 
properties that are quantified over by leibniz’s law (see Keefe 1995: 187–
188) . Yet another objection is that indeterminate-identity-involving proper-
ties such as the one expressed by the above predicate (assuming there are 
such properties) cannot determinately differentiate a from b (see lowe 1994: 
113–114) . Each of these arguments has, however, generated counterargu-
ments, and the status of vague identity remains controversial .10 I will assume 
that, for this reason, it is preferable that a theory avoids any commitment to 
the notion of vague identity .
The relation of constitution and the vagueness of objects
let me now turn to the details of the constitution account of vagueness . 
Some proponents of the constitution relation provide detailed analyses of 
vague objects in terms of constitution without further claiming that such a 
strategy avoids commitment to vague identity . lowe, for instance, provides 
such an account, but he is also one of the defenders of the possibility of 
vagueness of identity against Evans’ argument (see lowe 1994, 1997, 1999) . 
Others, however, explicitly claim that their account avoids such commitment 
(see, for instance, Morreau 2002: 342) . I shall take a closer look at the ac-
10 For an exposition and assessment of the most significant attempts to rebut Evans’ 
argument, see Noonan (2003: 112–117) and Curtis and Noonan (2014: 306–315) .
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count developed by Baker (2007, chapter 6), because it shows in detail how 
constitution can handle several distinct types of vagueness of objects .
Baker believes that the semantic account is insufficient to provide a plau-
sible explanation of the indeterminacy of the sentences of ordinary language . 
Moreover, she provides two arguments for the existence of worldly vagueness . 
One is based on the idea that it is impossible to precisify our language ad 
infinitum, because there will always be some residual vagueness in our con-
cepts (Baker 2007: 124–125) . The other is based on taking natural science 
at face value when it informs us that natural processes occur independently 
of our concepts and have no precise beginnings and endings (Baker 2007: 
126–127) . Baker states that the interest in linguistic solutions to vagueness 
stems from the interest in formal semantics, but doubts that formal semantics 
is an end in itself (Baker 2007: 123) .
Baker distinguishes and attempts to explain several kinds of worldly 
vagueness .
First, there is the vagueness of objects’ spatial and temporal boundaries . 
For instance, it may be indeterminate whether a particular hair that is com-
ing out of a dog is a constituent of the dog or not . The hair is a vague part 
of the dog . Or consider a house . There are a great number of aggregates of 
matter in the vicinity of the house and each of the aggregates is an equally 
good candidate for being the house . As a result, the house has a vague spatial 
boundary (Baker 2007: 129) .
Baker analyses vague parts and vague boundaries in terms of the place-
indexed existential predicate ‘exist at p’. ‘It is indeterminate whether the hair 
is a part of the dog’ means that it is indeterminate whether the dog exists at 
p, where p is the region of space occupied by the hair . If it is indeterminate 
where the boundaries of the house lie, it is indeterminate at which places the 
house exists . The indeterminacy of existence at p, however, presupposes that 
there are other ps where the object determinately exists (Baker 2007: 128), 
so no object can have vague parts or boundaries unless it definitely exists 
simpliciter . This claim helps Baker avoid the implication of vague existence 
that has been found to be unintelligible . On her theory, there are no vaguely 
existing entities . At most, there are entities existing vaguely at a place .
The vagueness of temporal boundaries is explained in a similar manner 
(Baker 2007: 130–131) . Baker considers the construction of a model house . 
There seems to be no precise moment at which the model house comes into 
existence . Consider the moment when the constructor has put all the blocks 
together, but has not attached the roof, which is placed next to the unfinished 
structure . Call the moment t . According to Baker, there are two possible sce-
narios, and their realization depends on what happens later . If the construc-
tion of the house is completed at a later point in time, then it is indeterminate 
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whether there exists a house at t . If the house is never finished, then it is false 
that there exists a house at t . Again, the idea is that an object cannot have an 
indeterminate boundary unless it exists . In the temporal case, an object must 
exist at some time or other in order for it to be meaningful to say that it exists 
indeterminately at a particular time .
Second, there is vagueness in the relation of constitution, which comes 
in two types . It may be indeterminate whether the constitution relation ob-
tains between an aggregate of matter and an object, or it may be indeter-
minate which aggregate of matter constitutes a given object . Baker accepts 
mereological universalism, according to which an aggregate is a mereological 
sum or fusion, and considers aggregates to be precise objects whose identity 
is wholly determined by the objects they contain (Baker 2007: 133) . In con-
trast, ordinary macro-objects are vague in the manner indicated above .
Importantly, the vagueness of the constitution relation is used by Baker 
to account for the vagueness of spatial and temporal boundaries in the fol-
lowing manner . The vagueness of spatial boundaries is explained in terms of 
the indeterminacy as to which precise aggregate constitutes a given macro-
object . Baker considers the case of Mt . Everest and asks whether it is identi-
cal to Schmeverest, which is supposed to be a mountain-shaped object that 
largely overlaps Everest, but includes a bit more of the foothills (Baker 2007: 
133) . We have seen that examples of this kind generate the puzzle of inde-
terminate identity . Is Everest the less inclusive object or the more inclusive 
one? Baker claims that on the constitution theory there is no puzzle . There is 
only one mountain, not many overlapping ones, so we do not have to decide 
which one Everest is . If we use the names ‘Everest’ and ‘Schmeverest’ in an 
ordinary manner, they both refer to the same mountain (Baker 2007: 134) . 
The mountain is a vague object, so it has vague boundaries, but both names 
refer to the very same vague object . So, there is no indeterminate reference to 
a number of precise objects, as the linguistic account would suggest . The in-
determinacy is located in the constitution relation: It is indeterminate which 
precise aggregate of matter constitutes the vague mountain . Further, we might 
use the names non-standardly, according to Baker, to refer not to the vague 
mountain, but to the precise aggregates . In that case the names would not 
refer to the same object, but to two aggregates that are determinately distinct 
(Baker 2007: 134) .
This account shows that there is no commitment to indeterminate iden-
tity . The question ‘Is Everest identical to Schmeverest?’ either gets an affirma-
tive answer if the names are used standardly to refer to the same vague object, 
or a negative one if they are used non-standardly to refer to aggregates . The 
answer also comes out negative if ‘Everest’ refers to the vague mountain and 
‘Schmeverest’ to a precise aggregate . A vague object cannot be identical to a 
precise aggregate . The puzzling question of which aggregate of matter Ever-
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est is identical to is simply misplaced on Baker’s account . Ordinary objects 
are vague and they are never identical to precise aggregates . The relation 
between ordinary objects and aggregates is not identity, but constitution 
(Baker 2007: 134) .
As for the vagueness of temporal boundaries, that is explained by the fact 
that sometimes it may be indeterminate whether an aggregate constitutes an 
object at all . here Baker considers the construction of a house and focuses 
again on a moment at which a certain structure is built but the structure is 
not yet a definite house – call the moment t . It will be recalled that if the 
structure is never finished and turned into a complete house, then it is not 
true that at t it is indeterminate whether the house exists . It is only if the 
house is finished at a later moment t’ that it may be indeterminate whether 
there exists a house at t . In that case there exists an aggregate of matter at t 
such that it is indeterminate whether the aggregate constitutes a house . If the 
house is not finished, the aggregate of matter still exists at t, but it definitely 
does not constitute a house, because it is not in the house-favourable circum-
stances (Baker 2007: 134) . Baker emphasizes again that there is no problem 
of vague identity in this case: ‘The house such that it is indeterminate that 
it exists at t is identical to the house such that it is determinate that it exists 
at t’ . Thus we do not need indeterminate identity statements that, as Gareth 
Evans showed, lead to contradiction when coupled with the thesis that there 
are vague objects’ (Baker 2007: 131n) .
This completes my exposition of Baker’s constitution theory as applied 
to the phenomenon of vagueness of objects . Other constitution theorists pro-
pose similar solutions to the phenomenon . For example, Morreau writes:
Suppose there is a special relation of constitution, distinct from identity, in 
which, say, a statue stands to a quantity of bronze, or a cat to a quantity of 
animal tissue . Then material objects can be vague if they are indefinitely con-
stituted by quantities of matter without being indefinitely identical to them . 
(Morreau 2002: 342)
lowe, commenting on his solution to the Problem of the Many, cast in terms 
of the cat Tibbles and aggregates of feline tissue c–cn, states:
… we can no longer insist that c […] is indisputably the one and only con-
stituter of Tibbles . But we needn’t be driven to saying that Tibbles has many 
constituters: we can say that she has just one constituter, but that it is inde-
terminate whether this is c or a certain cn . That is, we can say that it is neither 
determinately true nor determinately false that it is c, as opposed to c1 or c153 or 
some other cn, that constitutes Tibbles at present – though it is determinately 
true that just one of them does, because whichever candidate were chosen as 
occupying the role of constituter of Tibbles would exclude all others from that 
role . (lowe 1995a: 180)
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We can see that the general strategy of the constitution theorist is to change 
the perspective from which we assess the problematic cases . Instead of see-
ing the relationship between Everest and Schmeverest or Tibbles and an ag-
gregate of feline tissue as a ‘horizontal’ relationship between objects of the 
same kind, and asking whether the relationship between them is identity or 
difference, we are advised to see the relationship as a ‘vertical’ one – between 
a ‘higher-level’ object and its ‘lower-level’ constituter – and ask whether the 
higher-level object is constituted by the lower-level one . We might be driven 
to the answer that the constitution relation is vague, but unlike the identity 
case, this is not a problem . Why not? It will be remembered that Evans’ ar-
gument shows that if we assume that a and b are indeterminately identical, 
then, paradoxically, they are distinct . But indeterminate constitution does 
not generate a similar paradox . One cannot construe an analogous argument 
from the assumption that a is indeterminately constituted by b to the conclu-
sion that a is not constituted by b at all . Evans’ argument assumes that the in-
determinately identical objects a and b will have distinct properties and then 
uses the contrapositive of leibniz’s law (the Non-Identity of the Dissimilar) 
to argue for the distinctness of their possessors . The indeterminately consti-
tuted object and the indeterminately constituting object will, undoubtedly, 
have different properties too . But this fact does not entail they cannot stand 
in the indeterminate constitution relation, because there is nothing like a law 
of the ‘Non-Constitution of the Dissimilar’ that would be analogous to the 
contrapositive of leibniz’s law to which Evans’ argument appeals .
In the next part I shall look more closely at whether the constitution 
theory can really meet the expectations that Baker claims it can . Is it really 
the case that analysing vagueness of objects in terms of the vagueness of con-
stitution provides a plausible explanation that does not rely on the notion of 
vague identity? In particular, can the analysis that Baker offers be applied to 
all puzzling cases of indeterminate spatial and temporal boundaries that have 
been formulated in the relevant literature?
Constitution theory and the diachronic vagueness of objects
The claim I wish to defend in this section is that the success of the constitu-
tion theory in avoiding vague identity is only partial and results from the 
selection of relatively simple cases of vagueness . The constitution theory may 
account elegantly for the phenomenon of ‘fuzzy’ boundaries, but there are 
other cases of vagueness of objects’ boundaries that seem to pose a challenge 
to the constitution account . The most obvious examples come from some 
diachronic puzzle cases, real or fictional .
let’s start with a real one, introduced to philosophical literature by 
Shoemaker (1963, reference adopted from Noonan (2003: 17)) . The Santa 
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Trinita bridge in Florence was completed in 1569 . In 1944 it was almost 
entirely destroyed by the German army . Photographs from the period show 
the remnants of the bridge piers buried in piles of debris . In 1958 the bridge 
was reconstructed . The builders used the original stones retrieved from the 
Arno River and new stones that were acquired from the same quarry as the 
original ones . The reconstructed bridge stands in Florence to this day . Is the 
new bridge the same as the old one? There are reasons we may cite in favour 
of the identity and there are reasons against . It seems that the identity of the 
old bridge and the new bridge is indeterminate .
Other philosophers provide fictional examples of the same phenome-
non . Van Inwagen (1995: 241–242) imagines a person, Alpha, who enters a 
philosophical cabinet which induces dramatic changes in the person’s com-
position . Van Inwagen, who believes that the criterion of personal persistence 
is the continuity of life, stipulates that the changes are so extensive that for 
some time there is no fact of the matter about whether life continues in the 
cabinet . Some time later a person, Omega, steps out of the cabinet . The ques-
tion is whether Alpha is the same person as Omega . Since at one stage it is 
indeterminate whether there is a person in the cabinet at all, it seems that the 
identity is indeterminate .
Still other examples might be cited, such as the Brown–Brownson case 
from Shoemaker (1963, reference adopted from Noonan (2003: 4)) or the 
Methuselah case from lewis (1983: 65) . These differ slightly from the above 
examples in that throughout the changes that the given person undergoes 
there is always a person determinately present . But any of these examples will 
serve equally well to illustrate my point against the constitution theory . For 
convenience, I will work with the Alpha–Omega case .
So, how might we approach the case with the apparatus provided by 
Baker in the explanation of vague temporal boundaries? To make the case a 
bit more precise, let us stipulate that t1 denotes the time when Alpha begins 
to exist, at t2 Alpha is outside the cabinet, about to step in, at t3 Alpha is dis-
solved inside the cabinet into a state of indeterminate existence, at t4 Omega 
steps out of the cabinet and t5 is a much later time when Omega has ceased 
to exist . Applying the constitution account to this case we obtain the follow-
ing set of claims:
At t1, Alpha is constituted by the aggregate of matter A1 .11 At t2, Alpha 
is constituted by the aggregate A2 (plausibly assuming that the matter that 
constitutes Alpha has changed since she began to exist, A1 is distinct from 
A2) . At t3, it is indeterminate whether Alpha exists: Inside the cabinet, there 
11 For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that, at each t, the objects that definitely exist 
at t are spatially precise, that is, constituted by a single precise aggregate of matter . 
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are numerous aggregates of matter A3 .1–A3 .n such that it is indeterminate 
whether any constitutes Alpha (Baker is a universalist about composition, 
so any fusion of particles inside the cabinet will compose an aggregate) . So 
far, this account does not substantially differ from Baker’s own account of 
vague temporal boundaries . Since Alpha definitely exists at t1 and t2, it is no 
problem to say that Alpha indeterminately exists at t3 . We have seen that, on 
Baker’s theory, indeterminate existence at a time presupposes determinate 
existence at another time . This state of affairs meets this condition; Alpha has 
a vague ending .
We can now construct a similar account of Omega’s history . At t4 Omega 
definitely exists and is constituted by A4 . At t5 Omega has ceased to exist, 
which means that, determinately, no aggregate constitutes Omega at t5 . What 
about t3? Well, at t3 it is indeterminate whether Omega exists . There are nu-
merous aggregates of matter in the cabinet, which we have already designated 
A3 .1–A3 .n, such that it is indeterminate whether any constitutes Omega . 
Again, it is no problem to say that it is indeterminate whether Omega exists 
at t3, because Omega definitely exists at t4 . So, Omega is an object with a 
vague beginning .
Now, we have already learned that questions such as whether Alpha is 
identical to or different from aggregate A1 at t1 are misplaced . Constitution 
is not identity and the constituted object is never identical to the constitut-
ing aggregate . But what about the relation between Alpha and Omega? The 
constitution theorist was able to avoid commitment to vague identity by re-
placing the ‘horizontal’ perspective on the relationship between objects and 
aggregates with the ‘vertical’ view of the relation of an object to its constitu-
tor . But a similar move is not available in this scenario, because the relation 
between Alpha and Omega is clearly a horizontal, ‘object–object’ relationship 
and it would not make any sense to see it as a vertical, ‘object–constitutor’ 
relationship .
The problem can be described in a different manner, from the perspec-
tive inside the cabinet . Suppose that t3* is a moment after the dissolution into 
indeterminacy is over and a person definitely exists inside the cabinet again . 
Then there are two candidate states of affairs inside the cabinet at t3* such 
that it is indeterminate which of them obtains . In the first situation none of 
aggregates A3 .1–A3 .n constitute Alpha at t3*, but one of these aggregates con-
stitutes Omega at t3* . This is the situation in which Alpha has ceased to exist 
and Omega has come into being . In the second situation the same aggregate 
constitutes both Alpha and Omega . In that case Alpha has not ceased to exist 
and persists with another name . Since we do not know which of these two 
states of affairs obtain at t3*, we cannot tell whether Alpha and Omega are 
the same person . And it is of no help to be told that in any of those situations 
the objects inside the cabinet are determinately distinct from the aggregates 
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inside the cabinet . The point is that it seems quite natural to say that if no 
aggregate constitutes Alpha, but one aggregate constitutes Omega at t3*, then 
Omega is not identical to Alpha, and if the same aggregate constitutes Alpha 
and Omega at t3*, then Omega is identical to Alpha . (Also note that this is 
perfectly in tune with clause (2) of Baker’s definition of constitution, which 
excludes the possibility of a single aggregate constituting two numerically 
distinct objects .) But since it is indeterminate which state of affairs obtains, it 
is indeterminate whether Omega is identical to Alpha .
Or consider assessing the scenario from the perspective of t4, when Omega 
steps out of the cabinet . Since it is indeterminate whether Alpha survives the 
dissolution at t3, it is indeterminate whether any aggregate at t4 constitutes 
Alpha . In particular, it is also indeterminate whether A4 constitutes Alpha at 
t4 . But A4 determinately constitutes Omega at t4 . If A4 determinately consti-
tutes Omega and it is indeterminate whether it constitutes Alpha, it seems 
inevitable to conclude that it is indeterminate whether Omega is Alpha .
In conclusion, the question of identity between Alpha and Omega re-
mains unresolved in this scenario even if we recast the relationship between 
objects and aggregates in terms of constitution, because Alpha and Omega 
are two objects of the same kind that are clearly not related by constitution, 
and the indeterminacy regarding which aggregates constitute them through-
out their careers only suggests that they stand in the relation of indeterminate 
identity .
Possible defensive strategies
What could the proponent of the constitution theory say in response? let 
me immediately set aside one possible reply . The proponent might claim that 
the constitution theory is primarily a theory of synchronic relation between 
objects and matter and was not developed to deal with diachronic identity 
issues . So, it is inappropriate to demand that it deals with diachronic identity 
puzzles such as the Alpha–Omega case .
This response is insufficient for two reasons . First, Baker clearly used 
the constitution theory to deal with diachronic vagueness when she set out 
to explain vague beginnings and endings of ordinary objects . The problem 
is that vague beginnings and endings do not constitute the only cases of dia-
chronic vagueness of objects . As we have seen, there are cases that we might 
call ‘mid-extension’ vagueness, in which there is a determinately existing ob-
ject at the beginning and at the end, but ‘its’ temporal extension is disrupted 
by a period of vagueness . The constitution theory should be able to give us 
a verdict in this case and, it seems, the verdict must be that these are cases of 
vague identity .
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The second reason is that ‘mid-extension’ vagueness can occur in syn-
chronic, or spatial, cases as much as in diachronic ones . Consider Mount 
Ushba, one of the most remarkable peaks in the Caucasus Mountains . There 
is a deep saddle at the top of the mountain that divides two massive summits . 
The mountain actually bears a single name, but one might plausibly claim that 
if the saddle were a bit deeper, it would be indeterminate whether there was a 
single mountain or two distinct mountains (call them Beta and Gamma) . In 
that case it would be indeterminate whether Beta extends through the saddle 
all the way to the exterior boundary of Gamma or whether it ceases to exist 
somewhere at the saddle, and vice versa for Gamma . Again, it would seem to 
be of no use to be told that the indeterminacy consists in it being indetermi-
nate which aggregate constitutes Beta and which constitutes Gamma . If dif-
ferent aggregates constitute Beta and Gamma, the most natural description is 
that Beta is not (identical to) Gamma, and if the same aggregate constitutes 
both Beta and Gamma, the most natural description is that Beta is (identical 
to) Gamma . But since it is indeterminate which aggregates constitute Beta 
and Gamma, the most natural description is, again, that the identity of Beta 
and Gamma is indeterminate . So there are spatial ‘mid-extension’ vagueness 
cases as well as temporal ones and the constitution theorists cannot rebut 
the challenge by pointing out that the theory has been designed to deal with 
spatial vagueness only .
For simplicity, in what follows I will focus on the temporal cases only 
and continue assessing the Alpha-Omega case . To avoid the conclusion that 
the relationship between Alpha and Omega is that of vague identity, the con-
stitution theorist would have to show convincingly that Alpha and Omega 
are either determinately distinct or determinately identical . let us now con-
sider these two possibilities .
Could it be claimed that Alpha and Omega are distinct objects? There 
is one strategy it seems the constitution theorist might adopt to justify this 
claim . Some commentators have pointed out that Evans’ argument falsely 
associates the notion of vague identity with the notion of vague objects . For 
instance, Tye (1990: 555–557) argues that there might be vague objects even 
if identity is always precise . Each vague object is determinately identical to 
itself and determinately distinct from any other vague object, because they 
differ in properties (such as the ones referred to in Evans’ argument) . Mor-
reau also objects to the association of vague identity with vague objects: ‘The 
main problem with the argument from definite identities is just that there is 
no reason to think that things with fuzzy boundaries must have indefinite 
identities . Strangely, Evans did not even try to show that they must; perhaps 
it did not occur to him that having a fuzzy boundary and having an indefinite 
identity might be different things’ (Morreau 2002: 338) .
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So perhaps the defender of the constitution account could claim that 
there are two distinct temporally vague objects in the Alpha–Omega case . 
After all, they differ in their properties . Alpha is such that it determinately 
exists from t1 to t3 and it is indeterminate whether it exists after t3 . Omega, 
in contrast, is such that it determinately exists after t3, but it is indeterminate 
whether it exists before t3 . So Alpha and Omega are distinct vague objects 
that differ with respect to the temporal location of their determinate and 
indeterminate existence .
The problem is that this supposition seems to be in tension with clause 
(2) of Baker’s account of constitution . The clause states that one aggregate 
of matter cannot simultaneously constitute two numerically distinct objects 
of the same kind . Consider A4 at t4 . We have supposed that this aggregate 
determinately constitutes Omega at t4, but we have also supposed that, since 
it is indeterminate whether Alpha exists at t4, it is indeterminate whether A4 
also constitutes Alpha at t4 . Now add to this the supposition currently under 
consideration that Alpha and Omega are numerically distinct objects . This 
situation does not directly contradict clause (2), but it makes one wonder: 
how could a single aggregate of matter determinately constitute one object 
(Omega) and indeterminately constitute a numerically distinct object (Al-
pha) of the same type? If Alpha is an object distinct from Omega and if it is 
indeterminate whether it exists at t4, it seems that aggregate A4 would have to 
do just that . And it would seem that someone who proposed that an aggre-
gate cannot constitute two distinct things of the same kind at the same time 
should also hold to this principle even if the existence of one of the objects 
is indeterminate .
The other possible strategy is to claim that Alpha and Omega are identi-
cal . here the proponent of this reply might attempt to model this case along 
the lines of the Everest–Schmeverest case and claim that ‘Alpha’ and ‘Omega’, 
when used standardly, determinately refer to the very same vague object, let 
us call it Almega, and that the vagueness consists in what constitutes the 
vague object . But this latter clause is where things get tricky for this sort of 
reply .
The reason is, of course, that now we are not talking about an object 
at a particular time, but an object spanning a period of time . So we cannot 
locate its temporal vagueness in the indeterminacy regarding which single ag-
gregate of matter constitutes it at a particular time . Rather, the proponent of 
such a reply must begin to speak of precise series of aggregates and say that the 
vagueness of the object consists in its being indeterminate which such series 
of aggregates constitutes the object throughout its career .12
12 See lowe (2005) for an account of how one might construe such series . 
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The problem is that such an account would commit its proponents 
to truly bizarre objects . The ‘Everest–Schmeverest’ object may be strange, 
but not beyond comprehension . After all, the two aggregates denoted by 
the names ‘Everest’ and ‘Schmeverest’ (when used non-standardly, as Baker 
points out) massively overlap and only differ in the spatial boundary at the 
foot . As a result, it is not so difficult to imagine that there is just one object 
with a somewhat fuzzy lower boundary .
In contrast, Almega, if there were such an object, would really challenge 
our imagination . It would be an object whose temporal vagueness consists 
in the indeterminacy between three careers: the career of an object spanning 
from t1 to t3 (only the determinate career of Alpha), the career of an object 
spanning from t3 to t5 (only the determinate career of Omega) and the ca-
reer of an object spanning all the way from t1 to t5 (the career of the whole 
Almega) . To each of these careers there would correspond a precise series of 
aggregates, constituting the object throughout the given period of time . The 
bizarreness of the object may most clearly be seen from the perspective of t3 . 
The temporal vagueness of Almega entails that it either a) ceases to exist at t3, 
or b) begins to exist at t3, or c) exists at t3 . Now that is really mysterious .
Moreover, it could be shown that on this analysis Almega would only ex-
ist indeterminately throughout its career, because at each point of its career it 
would exist if constituted by some aggregates, but it would not exist if consti-
tuted by others . Take, for instance, t2 and call the three series corresponding 
to the three careers listed above SA, SO and SA/O, respectively . If Almega is 
constituted by SA or SA/O, then it exists at t2, but if it is constituted by SO, 
then it does not . Since analogical results can be reached for each t, it follows 
that at no time Almega exists determinately . But we have seen that Baker 
insists that an object can only exists indeterminately at t if it determinately 
exists at some other time .13
There are further problems with this proposal . Explaining temporal 
vagueness by positing multiple series of aggregates such that it is indetermi-
nate which series constitutes the vague object over time is reminiscent of the 
perdurantist analysis of temporal vagueness . According to perdurantism, or 
the doctrine of temporal parts, objects persist through time by having tempo-
ral parts at different times . Just as a statue exists in space by having different 
parts at different spatial points, according to perdurantists it exists in time by 
having different parts at different temporal points . So when you observe a 
statue at t*, you are observing it by observing one temporal part of it . But the 
whole statue is not located at t*; it is an object located in a sequence of times . 
Perdurantism is commonly associated with mereological universalism . That 
13 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for deriving this implication of the suggested 
solution . 
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means that any two temporal parts compose a temporally extended object . 
For instance, there is an object consisting of the Eiffel Tower at t1 and the 
statue of David at t2 . Most of these objects are utterly uninteresting and never 
acquire a name in language . But, nevertheless, their ontological status is the 
same as that of everyday persisting objects such as statues or towers . Applied 
to the problem of vague beginnings, for instance, the perdurantist would say 
that where we believe there is an object with a vague temporal boundary, 
there are, in fact, a great number of distinct perduring objects which differ 
only with respect to the precise moment when they begin to exist .
The similarity between the perdurantist analysis of temporal vagueness 
and the analysis in terms of series of aggregates lies in the following observa-
tion: It seems that the series of aggregates that constitute persisting objects, 
according to the version of constitution theory currently under considera-
tion, serve the same function as the perduring objects of the perdurantist . If a 
perdurantist wished to provide a metaphysical account of Almega, she might 
say that the vagueness of the object consists in there being three distinct 
perduring objects (an object existing from t1 to t3, an object existing from t3 
to t5 and an object existing from t1 to t5), and it is metaphysically unsettled 
which of these objects Almega is . The key problem is that perdurantists posit 
the multitude of perduring objects precisely so that they can avoid recogniz-
ing genuinely vague objects . Positing a great number of precise perduring 
objects where we believe there is a single object with vague temporal bounda-
ries enables the perdurantist to say that the term denoting such an object, 
e .g ., ‘David’, is referentially indeterminate among the various perduring ob-
jects, without the need to postulate controversial vagueness in objects . So the 
multiplicity of precise perduring objects that the perdurantist posits can be 
regarded as the cost of being able to avoid genuinely vague objects and treat 
vagueness as a linguistic phenomenon only .
Now, if the constitution theorist needs to posit series of aggregates in 
order to explain the temporal vagueness of Almega, it would seem to be more 
reasonable for her to give up on a metaphysical analysis of vagueness and opt 
for a linguistic account, because she has already paid the ontological price . 
She could simply claim that the names ‘Alpha’ and ‘Omega’ are referentially 
indeterminate among distinct series of aggregates and that the indeterminacy 
of the identity statement ‘Alpha = Omega’ boils down to the fact that on 
some sharpenings of the meanings of the names they denote distinct series 
and on others they denote the same single series, so that the names are thus 
indeterminate in reference but there is no vagueness in the denoted objects . 
But, instead, the constitution theorist claims that the names denote the same 
vague object, Almega, and the vagueness of the object consists in its being 
unsettled which series of aggregates constitutes the object in its career . This 
is clearly the less parsimonious solution to the problem, because it postulates 
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vague objects as sui generis entities in addition to a multiplicity of precise 
series of aggregates .
It seems, then, that the constitution theorist cannot easily use any of the 
defensive strategies sketched above . She cannot say that Alpha and Omega 
are distinct vague objects unless she is prepared to accept that one aggregate 
can determinately constitute an object while indeterminately constituting a 
different object of the same kind . She cannot say that Alpha and Omega are 
the same vague object and that this object’s vagueness resides in the vague-
ness of constitution . That answer would seem to require the postulation of 
truly bizarre objects and, in addition, a plurality of series of aggregates that 
seems to undermine the rationale for a metaphysical analysis of temporal 
vagueness in the first place . And, finally, she cannot say that the constitution 
theory was not designed to deal with temporal vagueness and should not be 
held accountable for failing to do so . The theory has actually been applied to 
temporal vagueness . Also, as I have attempted to show, the theory generally 
fails to account for ‘mid-extension’ vagueness, which can be found in spatial 
as well as temporal cases .
The constitution theorist is left with solutions that will all seem unsys-
tematic . She can argue that there is, in fact, no ‘mid-extension’ vagueness . 
She could say that, in fact, there is always a single determinate answer as 
to whether an object with a seemingly indeterminately disrupted extension 
ceases to exist or persist, but that it may be beyond our abilities to ever dis-
cover this answer . Or she could opt for the perdurantist solution and claim 
that vagueness in these respects is merely linguistic . In any case, these so-
lutions would be unsystematic, because they would analyse simple cases of 
spatial and temporal vagueness (such as vague beginnings and endings of 
objects) in terms of constitution theory, and utilize a different theory to ac-
count for ’mid-extension’ vagueness .
One final solution might be adopted by the constitution theorist: To 
concede that it is not really the case that accepting the constitution theory 
means we can avoid the problematic concept of vague identity, and then to 
argue, as some have done, that vague identity is less problematic than we 
think . This is the solution that seems to have been endorsed by lowe, and I 
believe it is a better one .14
14 I would like to thank the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR) for supporting this 
paper with grant no . 17–12551S .
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